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HIS Article surveys developments under Texas law in the area of
legal ethics and professional responsibility from November, 1990
through November, 1991. On January 1, 1990, the new Texas Rules
of Disciplinary Conduct (Texas Rules) became effective.' Although these
new Texas Rules are based on the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules),2 they have various nonuniform
amendments reflecting Texas practice, and thus a brief analysis of the com-
paratively few cases during this period applying the new Texas Rules should
be particularly useful in helping to clarify their meaning. In addition, we
shall also look at a few cases applying new case law involving disciplinary
procedure, and a new case deciding when a judge may appear as an expert
witness under the Canons of Judicial Conduct.
II. TEXAS RULE 1.06: CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
Texas Rule 1.06 is the general rule governing conflicts of interest. It gen-
erally bans what is often called "simultaneous representation of conflicting
interests." Not only must a lawyer not represent both plaintiff and defend-
ant in the same suit,3 but it has long been the general rule that the lawyer
may not sue client A on behalf of client B while simultaneously representing
client A in another, completely unrelated matter.4
For example, assume that a lawyer represents Wife in a divorce suit
against Husband while simultaneously representing Husband who is seeking
to collect on his worker's compensation claim. In that case, Tennessee dis-
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. I am indebted to Kathryn Firsching, the
Stuart N. Greenberger Research Assistant in Legal Ethics, from the Class of 1992.
1. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct) (1989) [hereinafter TEX. RULE] (located in the pocket part for
Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G app., following § 83.006 of the
Government Code).
A careful analysis of the changes, the reasons behind them, and the relevant case law that
led to the new Texas Rules is found in Robert P. Schuwerk and John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to
the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, 27A HOUSTON L. REV. 1-560 (1990).
2. The ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Rules at its August, 1983 annual
meeting.
3. TEX RULE 1.06(a). See also, Jedwabny v. Philadelphia Trans. Co., 135 A.2d 252 (Pa.
1957) (holding that the rule extends to case where one of the original plaintiffs is joined as a
defendant) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 966 (1958).
4. Memphis & Shelby County Bar Ass'n v. Sanderson, 378 S.W.2d 173 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1963).
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barred the lawyer for the conflict. 5 Although the two cases (the divorce and
the worker's compensation claim) are completely unrelated, and there is no
claim that the lawyer learned a client confidence in one case that could be
used against the client in the other case, there is a breach of the lawyer's
duty of loyalty to the client. The lawyer is a fiduciary and, as such, has the
typical fiduciary obligation not to breach the duty of loyalty owed to the
principal.
Consider also LB.M. v. Levin.6 The court disqualified a law firm that rep-
resented Levin in an antitrust case against I.B.M. because the law firm, on
occasion, was also writing labor law opinion letters for I.B.M. When an
I.B.M. representative sought out the law firm, the firm told I.B.M. that it
had filed suit against I.B.M. The representative did not object. Yet the
court disqualified the law firm, 7 even though it is safe to assume that I.B.M.
was neither a callow youth nor befuddled widow. The court reasoned that
when a lawyer represents one client in a suit against another, "some 'adverse
effect' on the lawyer's exercise of independent judgment on behalf of a client
may result from the attorney's adversary posture toward that client in an-
other matter." For example, in the attorney's efforts to please client A (or
client B), there might be a "diminution in the vigor of his representation of
the client in the other matter."9 The lawyer owes both clients undivided
loyalty.
The purpose of this simultaneous adverse representation rule is to protect
the systemic interest in the fair administration of justice as well as to protect
each client's loyalty interest. Thus, it often may be the case that even con-
sent in such circumstances will not cure the breach of loyalty because the
attorney, as a fiduciary, should not "profit from breach of the duty of loy-
alty." 10 Courts will normally not let the lawyer accused of a conflict try to
avoid these ethical responsibilities by dropping the less favored client like a
hot potato." In fact, this doctrine is often called the "hot potato rule."' 12
Against this background it is difficult to understand the casually written
decision in Conoco v. Baskin.13 The facts are unfortunately rather complex.
The law firm of Scott, Douglas & Luton (SD & L) regularly represented
5. Id. at 189.
6. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
7. Id. at 283.
8. I.B.M., 579 F.2d at 280.
9. Id.
10. Laurence S. Fordham, There Are Substantial Limitations on Representation of Clients
in Litigation Which Are Not Obvious in the Code of Professional Responsibility, 33 THE Busi-
NESS LAWYER 1193, 1204 (Mar. 1978).
11. See Cinema 5, Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1976) (disqualified attor-
ney from both cases rather than letting him drop the less preferred client).
12. E.g., Picker Int'l, Inc. v. Varian Assoc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio 1987),
aff'd, 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (the case that was probably the first one to use the term
"hot potato"); see also, Harte Biltmore Ltd. v. First Pennsylvania Bank, N.A., 655 F. Supp.
419 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (conflict created by merger of firms is not allowed).
See generally Ronald D. Rotunda, One Potato, Two Potato, Three Potato, Four, 14 LEGAL
TIMES (of Washington, D.C.) 23 (Aug. 12, 1991) (discussing cases).
13. 803 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
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Conoco in various suits involving conversion of Conoco's gas rights in wells
in Northern Texas. Conoco sought at trial to disqualify SD & L from con-
tinuing to represent Conoco's opposing party in the case captioned Discovery
v. Enerfin and Conoco. Conoco alleged a conflict of interest because SD & L
concurrently represented Conoco in other litigation, and because two law-
yers, formerly in another firm and now with SD & L, had represented Co-
noco in another case now settled.
The court defined the issue as whether a conflict existed arising from the
law firm's simultaneous representation of adversary clients in a single matter
while that firm is representing the defendant in six other unrelated matters. 14
SD & L alleged that Conoco (via a telephone call by SD & L to Conoco's
general counsel) had consented to its continued representation of Discovery,
but the court rejected that argument. 15 Texas Rule 1.06(c) permits an attor-
ney to continue multiple representation of adversary clients where, first, the
attorney "reasonably believes" his or her representation of each client will
not be materially affected and, second, consent is obtained from each client
after "full disclosure of the existence, nature, implications and possible ad-
verse consequences" of such multiple representations. 16
Applying the second portion of this test, the court found no valid, in-
formed consent. 17 For example, the general counsel for Conoco had no per-
sonal familiarity with the seven lawsuits, and the lawyers (who were
members of the firm suing Conoco on one suit and defending it in others) did
not fully discuss with the client the factors outlined by Texas Rule
1.06(c)(2).
However, after having ruled that there was no valid "consent," the court
found that there had been a valid "waiver." 1 8 Conoco, the court said,
should have moved more swiftly. It "delayed" bringing the disqualification
motion.19 However, the court does not explain where this "waiver" rule
comes from. It does not come from the new ethics rules. If the lawyers do
not secure fully informed consent from their client, the court should not put
the burden on the client. One would think that the client, Conoco, is enti-
tled to rely on its own lawyers to bring home to it the significance of what is
going on, but Conoco's lawyers (appearing adversely to Conoco in other
matters) never did that.
The strict requirements of Texas Rule 1.06(c) demand that the lawyers
bring home to the client the significance of the adverse simultaneous repre-
sentation, and carefully advise the client (in that case, Conoco) of the costs
and benefits of granting consent. Indeed, the commentary to this section
advises the prudent lawyer to secure a valid waiver in writing.20 If the law-
yer does not protect the client by securing an explicit, informed consent, as
14. Id. at 419.
15. Id. at 420.
16. TEX. RULE 1.06(c).
17. Conoco, 803 S.W.2d at 420.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. TEX RULE 1.06 comment 8.
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the rule requires, then, the court appears to be saying, the lawyer need only
secure an implied waiver.
The court then took issue with Conoco's willingness to allow SD & L to
continue to represent Conoco in the six other lawsuits so long as SD & L
withdrew from its representation of Discovery in its lawsuit against Conoco.
The court, furthermore, claimed that Texas Rule 1.06(e) allowed the law
firm to cure any conflict arising from multiple representation of adversary
clients by withdrawal from "one or more of the relationships to the extent
necessary for any remaining representation not to be in violation of these
Rules."' 21 However, the court makes a crucial assumption: it assumes that
the lawyer may pick and choose who the disfavored client will be, and with-
draw in the middle of litigation without client consent. Texas Rule 1.06(e)
says nothing about excusing the need to obtain client consent to withdraw
from a case, dropping the disfavored client like a hot potato. Texas Rule
1.15 governs withdrawal, and that Rule requires the client's consent.
22
Conoco also argued that the nature of the disqualification was such that
there was a per se rule of disqualification. A comment to Texas Rule 1.06,
for example, advises: "Ordinarily, it is not advisable for a lawyer to act as
advocate against a client the lawyer represents in some other matter, even if
the other matter is wholly unrelated and even if paragraphs (a), (b), and (d)
are not applicable."' 23 This view is supported by the full disclosure require-
ments of Texas Rule 1.06. In order to secure proper disclosure, a "disinter-
ested lawyer" must conclude that it would be proper for the client to agree
to the representation under the circumstances. 24 That is why many cases
have held that this type of conflict - suing the client in one case while
defending it in another - is simply not subject to waiver. 25 The court, how-
ever, rejected this argument, and thought it "totally unreasonable"26 to find
21. TEX RULE 1.06(e).
22. TEX. RULE 1.15(b)(1) provides that the lawyer cannot withdraw "unless withdrawal
can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client." The client
could always consent to withdrawal and waive its rights, but Conoco did not consent, as the
court noted. As comment 1 to this Rule points out: "Having accepted the representation, a
lawyer normally should endeavor to handle the matter to completion."
23. TEX. RULE 1.06 comment 11.
24. TEX. RULE 1.06 comment 7. See also TEX. RULE 1.06(c)(1): lawyer "reasonably be-
lieves" that the representation will not be adversely affected.
25. See, e.g., supra notes 3-9. See also Henry S. Drinker, LEGAL ETHICS 111 (1953);
Raymond L. Wise, LEGAL ETHICS 259 (2d ed. 1970);Charles W. Wolfram, MODERN LEGAL
ETHICS 350-52 (1986); Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, ATrORNEY CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST, 2 CORP. L. REv. 345, 347-51 (1979); Ronald D. Rotunda, PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 59-62 (West Black Letter Series, 3d ed. 1992).
The American Law Institute's Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, Third, § 209(2)
(tent. draft no. 4, April 10, 1991), provides:
"Unless all affected clients consent to the representation under the limitations
and conditions provided in § 202, a lawyer in civil litigation may not:
"(2) Represent one client in asserting or defending a claim against another
client currently represented by the lawyer, even if the matters are not related."
Section 202, in turn, provides that there is not valid consent if "[s]pecial circumstances render
it unlikely that the lawyer will be able to provide adequate representation to one or more of the
clients." § 202(2)(c). Of course, in Conoco the question of consent is moot because the court
acknowledged that there had been no valid consent secured.
26. 803 S.W. 2d at 421 (emphasis in original).
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any possibility of diminished loyalty in the firm's representation of Conoco
in the various suits.
The court admitted that Conoco's change of counsel will impose higher
litigation costs on it, but this increased cost, "if attributable to actionable
fault on the part of SD & L, is susceptible to recompense by money dam-
ages."' 27 Hence, Conoco, the court concluded, has an adequate remedy at
law and should not be eligible for mandamus relief.28 This last conclusion is
somewhat surprising, because it is inconsistent with the purposes behind
Texas Rule 1.06, which focuses on loyalty; 29 the possibility of money dam-
ages (assuming that they are not too speculative to be determined) does not
cure a violation of Texas Rule 1.06.30
A month after this case was decided, the court of appeals in Waco, Texas,
decided another case of allegedly simultaneous representation of conflicting
interests. That case involved allegations of conflicts in the context of a crim-
inal prosecution. That decision, Simons v. State,31 did not explicitly cite
Texas Rule 1.06(b), but the principle decided there is governed by this sec-
tion. The State charged an indigent prison inmate with aggravated assault of
a prison guard, and the district court appointed a Ms. Elizabeth Derieux as
her counsel. The inmate/appellant pled guilty but reserved the right to ap-
peal her motion to dismiss Ms. Derieux as her appointed trial counsel. Ap-
pellant (who was represented by a different attorney on this motion)
contended that Ms. Derieux had a potential conflict of interest because her
salary was paid by the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and that De-
partment oversaw the administration of the Inmate Defense Counsel Pro-
gram of which Ms. Derieux was director.
The Court noted that if the state instituted a program to provide counsel
for indigent prisoners accused of crimes, such a program of necessity must
be administered by some state agency.32 Even though this situation did cre-
ate the potential for a conflict of interest, it is not enough for a defendant to
allege a potential conflict of interest. Appellant must show an "actual" con-
flict of interest. 33 The potential conflict did not automatically disqualify the
attorneys in the Inmate Defense Counsel Program because adequate safe-
guards existed. The attorneys involved are subject to the Texas Disciplinary
Rules, and these rules already impose on lawyers representing indigent pris-
oners the affirmative duty to report any actual conflicts to the appointing
27. Id. at 422.
28. Id.
29. The first section of the comment to TEXAS RULE 1.06 is entitled "Loyalty to a Cli-
ent," and the first sentence of comment I to Rule 1.06 provides: "Loyalty is an essential ele-
ment in the lawyer's relationship to a client."
30. In Grievance Committee v. Rottner, 203 A.2d 82 (Conn. 1964), a law firm accepted
an assault and battery case for O'Brien and against Twible, while it was representing Twible in
a collection matter against Houghton. The cases were not at all related, and there was not
danger of any abuse of confidences. Yet the court disciplined Rottner. The court did not
consider Rottner excused because the client had not suffered monetary harm. The client suf-
fered a loss of loyalty.
31. 805 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, no writ).
32. Id. at 521.
33. Id.; accord Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 485-88 (1978).
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court, which may then investigate the nature of the conflict. Attorney Der-
ieux also testified that the state board had not interfered with her profes-
sional obligations to the appellant, and she had perceived no conflict of
interest.
As a general rule, there is no inherent, per se conflict merely because one
who is not a client pays for the lawyer to represent the actual client. 34 Auto
insurance companies, for example, pay counsel to represent the insured.
Yet, the lawyer owes her duty of loyalty to the insured. 3" The law does not
automatically forbid such arrangements.
Yohey v. State36 is another case raising conflicts issues in the context of a
criminal prosecution. The case was decided under the former Texas Disci-
plinary Rules. The appellant contended that the trial court's failure to pro-
vide adequate funding for private expert assistance for the indigent criminal
defendant "forced" counsel into a violation of the now-repealed Texas Code
of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-101 (A) and DR 6-101 (A)(2). The
court also cited and referred to the new Texas Rules 1.01, 1.06(b)(2), and
5.04, corresponding to the now-repealed rules. The appellant argued that
the court's failure to provide adequate funding placed counsel in a conflict
between his own financial interest and the interest of the accused in having
an adequate defense, because counsel is obliged to either finance the private
expert assistance from his own personal funds or forgo such assistance. The
appellate court, however, found no evidence in the record that trial counsel
had incurred any out-of-pocket expenses, or had in any way not been ade-
quately compensated for his services.37
Finally, the court, in dictum, asserted that "violations of disciplinary rules
by attorneys are to be dealt with by means of administrative mechanisms set
forth within those rules; they are not to be used in such a way to attack a
judgment of a criminal conviction."' 38 This dictum is quite broad. Surely
there are Texas Rules that, if violated, would not affect the truth-finding
process of a trial. For example, the Texas Rules dealing with solicitation
and advertising would fall in this category. 39 On the other hand, it should
be equally clear that if the violation of the ethical rules would taint the truth
finding process, then it would be natural for the court to enforce that type of
34. TEX. RULE 1.08(e). That rule requires client consent. However, in this case it is
clear that whomever the court appoints to represent the indigent, the state will be footing the
bill if the lawyer wants to be paid. The criminal defendant is, after all, indigent. Thus, an
indigent who does not consent is really making a choice to find his own counsel or to proceed
pro se. The appellant here did not want either of those alternatives.
35. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 158 - 69 (5th ed. 1991).
36. 801 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, pet. ref'd).
37. Id. at 240.
38. Id.
39. Lefrak v. Arabian American Oil Co., 527 F.2d 1136 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that the
plaintiff's lawyer's allegedly improper acts of solicitation did not prejudice defendant and thus
the court would not disqualify plaintiff's lawyer whom plaintiff desired to keep as his lawyer);
see also Board of Educ. of N. Y. v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that if
there is no claim that a trial will be "tainted," then the court should not enforce the discipli-
nary rules in the course of litigation).
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ethical violation in the course of litigation, not merely in the course of a
collateral discipline proceeding. A claim of incompetent assistance of coun-
sel in a criminal case, or a claim that the lawyer's conflicts of interest pre-
vented the lawyer from presenting an adequate defense - the type of claim
raised in Yohey - should fall into the taint category. The court rejected the
merits of this conflicts charge, but if the court had found the claims to have
merit, its casual assertion - that such "violations of disciplinary rules by
attorneys are to be dealt with by means of administrative mechanisms set
forth within those rules; they are not to be used in such a way to attack a
judgment of criminal conviction" 4 - is surprising.
III. TEXAS RULE 1.10: SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE
EMPLOYMENT
Texas Rule 1.10 governs what is often called the "revolving door" be-
tween government service and private practice. The rule recognizes that
there are benefits in having lawyers with private practice experience work in
the government for periods of time and vice versa. However, there can be
disadvantages as well. For example, one does not want the government law-
yers disqualified from securing private employment; nor does one want to
allow the government lawyer to be able to abuse the office in order to secure
later lucrative private employment. Further, one does not want the govern-
ment lawyer to be at a competitive advantage by being able to use, for pri-
vate purposes, confidential information acquired while in government
service.41
Texas Rule 1.10 attempts to deal with these various concerns. Spears v.
Fourth Court of Appeals,42 was the only reported case within the last year
interpreting this very important rule. An attorney, Margaret Maisel, served
as Chairman of Texas's Industrial Accident Board (IAB) from August 1984
until October 1985. Nine days before her tenure was over, one Jesse Casias
was allegedly injured at an IAB office when a chair collapsed beneath him
while he attended a pre-hearing conference. IAB's Executive Director, Wil-
liam Treacy, informed Chairman Maisel of the incident and she, in turn,
instructed the executive director to make sure that all chairs in all the IAB's
offices throughout the state were inspected.
After leaving IAB, Maisel joined a private firm and then accepted as a
client the same Jesse Casias, the injured visitor. She represented him in his
worker's compensation claim for injuries sustained during his visit to the
IAB office. In addition, another attorney at Maisel's firm represented Casias
in his suit against the IAB under the Texas Tort Claims Act. Maisel, how-
ever, was not participating in that case.
The supreme court noted that both the State, seeking disqualification, and
40. Yohey, 801 S.W.2d at 240.
41. See, Thomas D. Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a Former Agency Offi-
cial in Matters Before an Agency, 1980 DUKE L. J. 1; Ronald D. Rotunda, Ethics Problems in
Federal Agency Hiring of Private Attorneys, 1 GEORGETOWN J. LEGAL ETHICS 85 (1987).
42. 797 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1990).
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Casias, opposing it, focused on Texas Rule 1.09, dealing with conflicts of
interest involving a former client.43 However, Texas Rule 1.09, by its own
terms, does not apply to the situation involving a former government attor-
ney.44 Indeed, the very first comment to Texas Rule 1.09 advises that the
question whether a lawyer, or a lawyer's law firm, "is prohibited from repre-
senting a client in a matter by reason of the lawyer's successive government
and private employment is governed by Rule 1.10 rather than this Rule." 45
Texas Rule 1.10 (a) provides that a "lawyer shall not represent a private
client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated person-
ally and substantially as a public officer or employee, unless the appropriate
government agency consents after consultation. '46 The next section deals
with the problem of imputation and provides that no lawyer in the same firm
as a lawyer subject to subsection (a) may knowingly undertake or continue
representation in the matter unless:
"(1) the lawyer subject to (a) is screened from any participation in
the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom: and
"(2) written notice is given with reasonable promptness to the ap-
propriate government agency."'47
The court said that violation of the Texas discipline rules, although "not
controlling" in disqualification motions, may be enforced by disqualification
of the lawyers violating the conflict rules because the rules are "guide-
lines."148 In this respect, Texas appears to be more reluctant than most juris-
dictions to enforce the ethical rules in the course of litigation.49 These
"guidelines" are more than the musings of an ivory tower commentator.
They have an independent legal effect; their violation, after all, can cause a
lawyer to lose her license.
The IAB denied receiving written notice - as required by Texas Rule
1.10(b)(2), if the law firm accepts representation within the meaning of
Texas Rule 1.10(a) - of Maisel's law firm's representation of Casias as a
client adverse to the IAB. The IAB stated that it first received notice that
Maisel had relevant knowledge about the case when her deposition was
taken in August 1989. However, the court was concerned that the IAB did
not make a motion to disqualify Maisel's associate or her firm until January
43. Id. at 656.
44. Id.
45. TEX. RULE 1.09 comment 1.
46. TEX. RULE 1.10(a).
47. TEX. RULE 1-10(b).
48. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656.
49. See, Robert C. Hacker & Ronald D. Rotunda, Standing, Waiver, Laches, and Appeal-
ability in Attorney Disqualification Cases, 3 CORP. L. REV. 82 (1980); CHARLES WOLFRAM,
MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 329 (1986): "The motion for a judicial order disqualifying a lawyer
in pending litigation because of conflict is a traditional remedy that has come into prominence
in recent years. (Although there are] temptations for strategic manipulation [t]he remedy is
solidly entrenched, if with such reservations, and might reflect judicial awareness of the fact
that conflicts rules are frequently violated by lawyers and yet are too rarely enforced in disci-
plinary proceedings. Courts fill the void." (footnotes omitted). See also, THOMAS D. MOR-
GAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS 123 - 201 (5th ed. 199 1)(discussing cases).
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2, 1990, six days before the trial date. The court wondered, but did not
decide, whether this late filing served to waive the IAB's rights.50
The court did not refer to the fact that there is a procedure under the
Texas Rules that a party must follow in order to waive a disqualification.
Texas Rule 1.10(a) requires that the government agency "consent after con-
sultation." 5' "Consultation" is a term of art, specifically defined as "com-
munication of information and advice reasonably sufficient to permit the
client to appreciate the significance of the matter in question."'52 The Texas
Rules do not recognize any "implied" waiver. There is a specific procedure
pursuant to which attorney Maisel may ask the IAB to waive its rights, and
that procedure was clearly not followed.
Perhaps the court meant to refer to estoppel or forfeiture of rights. If the
IAB knew of its rights and specifically determined not to exercise them for
tactical advantages, then the IAB should be held to have made a calculated
decision to have forfeited its rights. But the facts, as outlined by the
supreme court, do not raise this question. We know that the State waited
approximately six months to file a motion to disqualify, but we do not know
why. Perhaps the State was not fully aware of its rights. After all, the court
later noted that the State, the attorneys for Casias, and the court of appeals
all devoted a great deal of time to discussing Texas Rule 1.09 (a Rule, that
"by its own terms," is "not applicable") instead of Texas Rule 1.10.3 If
those kinds of mistakes can be made, and that is quite natural when a new
set of rules goes into effect, it is hardly surprising that it might take a while
for the State to appreciate what its rights were, and then decide whether to
exercise them. All that takes time. Or, the State may have knowingly de-
cided to use the ethics rules for dilatory purposes. The court makes no fac-
tual conclusions, but only the latter interpretation - a fact scenario that
should be unusual - should be held to lead to a forfeiture of rights.
The IAB contended that Maisel was disqualified because as statutory legal
advisor to the IAB5 4 Maisel represented the IAB in connection with the
Casias injury, thus disqualifying her under Rule 1.10. The IAB also alleged
that Maisel was disqualified under Texas Rule 3.08 because she was a neces-
sary witness at trial. That point will be evaluated, below, in connection with
our discussion of Texas Rule 3.08, the advocate-witness rule.
The court held that the burden is on the movant to establish, "with speci-
ficity" the violation of disciplinary rules necessary for disqualification.55 The
supreme court further found that the trial court had not abused its discretion
in refusing disqualification of Maisel's firm. Maisel did not violate Texas
Rule 1.10(a) because she did not "participate substantially and personally"
in the matter subject to litigation. While she knew of the accident, and then
50. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656 n.l.
51. TEX. RULE 1.10(a).
52. See Tex. Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct (Terminology) (1989).
53. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 656.
54. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307 § 2(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).




requested that all the chairs be checked, she never worked on Casias's case
on behalf of the IAB. As the court emphasized, she must have " 'hands-on'
involvement;" there "must be personal and substantial participation. "56 Ms.
Maisel's legal title as statutory legal advisor to the IAB is, standing alone,
insufficient evidence that she had substantial and personal participation in
the matter.
Nor was there any violation of Texas Rule 1.10(c), which disqualifies a
former government lawyer who has acquired "confidential government in-
formation" while in government service. This Rule requires that the former
government lawyer must have acquired "actual" knowledge, not "imputed"
knowledge. 57 The trial court did not "abuse its discretion" in concluding
that Ms. Maisel had not acquired any relevant confidential information
about Mr. Casias's claim merely because, nine days before she left the IAB,
she was told about the collapse of the chair and then instructed the IAB
Executive Director to check all the chairs statewide.
Recall that the IAB denied receiving written notice of Maisel's law firm's
representation of Casias as a client adverse to the IAB. However, because
the Court determined that neither Texas Rule 1.10(a) nor 1.10(b) disquali-
fied Ms. Maisel personally, both she and members of her firm were not sub-
ject to disqualification.58 Hence, there was no need to erect a Texas Rule
1.10(b) screen around Ms. Maisel.
IV. TEXAS RULE 1.15: DECLINING OR TERMINATING REPRESENTATION
Texas Rule 1.15 governs the lawyer's decision to decline or withdraw
from representation. Vander Voort v. State Bar,59 considered a violation of
the former disciplinary rules 2-1 10(A)(1) and (A)(2), which are substantially
similar to new rules 1.15(c) and 1.15(b). The Court held that both attorneys
violated DR 2-110 (A)(2) of the former code by ceasing to represent a bank-
ruptcy client in November 1983 (by reason of his failure to pay fees) without
directly communicating this fact to their client and by failing to deliver over
his file to him.60 Furthermore the two failed to comply with bankruptcy
court rules in that neither moved to withdraw or substitute counsel until
January 6, 1983, over two months after ceasing to represent their client, and
then they failed to appear for the bankruptcy trial scheduled on January 3,
1983.
The court agreed with the appellants that the State Bar was in error in
failing to allege a violation of DR 2-1 10(A)(1) by number. 61 It is not enough
to merely allege the acts that constitute the violation; the Bar authorities
must allege the provision relied on. However, this error would not cause a
reversal because the appellants had failed to make this objection in the trial
56. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 657 (emphasis in original).
57. Id.; see also TEX. RULE 1.10 comment 7.
58. Id.
59. 802 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
60. Id. at 334.




In addition, the court overruled the appellants' contention that there was
no violation of DR 2-1 10(A)(2), which requires a lawyer who withdraws to
take "reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice" 63 to the client. The
appellants argued that an inadvertently missed docket call that does not
cause harm to a client is not a violation of the disciplinary rules. The court,
however, found that there was prejudice. The client was, in fact, harmed
because he had to write a pro se letter to prevent dismissal of his suit and he
had to retain other counsel to represent him at the show cause hearing.64
V. TEXAS RULE 3.03: CANDOR TOWARDS THE TRIBUNAL
Texas Rule 3.03 governs candor towards the tribunal. In Concha v. Con-
cha, 6 5 the court referred to Texas Rule 3.03(a)(1) and mentioned in passing
the possibility of disciplinary sanctions for an attorney's oral and written
misstatement of existing law.66 The court pointed out that the evidence
before it was insufficient to establish whether the lawyer's "misrepresenta-
tion of the status of [the] law" flowed from "perception or deception."'67
The court took no disciplinary action, but its reference may serve as a warn-
ing to lawyers that, in the future, it may be less charitable. 68
VI. TEXAS RULE 3.05: MAINTAINING IMPARTIALITY
Texas Rule 3.05 provides various provisions that deal with the need for
the tribunal to maintain impartiality. In particular, Texas Rule 3.05(b) re-
stricts ex parte comments. Kahn v. Garcia,69 relied on this section in revers-
ing a trial court that had used rules 13 and 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure to order the plaintiff to file no more motions in the case except to
respond to those filed by defendants. Rule 13 provides that the court may
62. Id.
63. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIILITY, DR 2-
1 10(A)(2) (1982). [hereinafter TEX. CODE].
64. Vander Voort, 802 S.W.2d at 334.
65. 808 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
66. Id. at 231. Although the court did not refer to Rule 3.03(a)(4), one should keep in
mind this related section. It provides that the lawyer shall not knowingly "fail to disclose to
the tribunal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse
to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel."
67. Id.
68. The trial court changed the surname of the minor child to that of the father's based on
the attorney's oral representation that case law held that a father has a constitutional right to
give his surname to his child. The attorney told the trial court he had left the case law sup-
porting this statement "on his desk." Later, in his appellate brief he cited one case that he
claimed held that the father has a protectable interest in having his children bear his surname,
but that decision made no reference to such a constitutional right. In fact, neither the Texas
Constitution nor case law gives a father a constitutional right to have his child named after
himself.
Note that courts in other jurisdictions have already enforced this provision. E.g., DeSisto
College, Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 2219 (1990);
Katris v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 562 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir. 1977).
69. 816 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
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use sanctions available under rule 215.70 Rule 215, in turn, does not specifi-
cally refer to an order preventing a party from filing motions, but it does
authorize a court to make orders that are "just. '7 1 The order in this case is
not just.
The trial court order in this case was an abuse of discretion because "a
party who is ordered to refrain from filing motions with the court is effec-
tively denied means to communicate with the court."' 72 The court relied on
Texas Rule 3.05(b), which supports this conclusion because it prohibits a
lawyer from communicating ex parte with a tribunal for the purpose of influ-
encing the court concerning a pending matter. The lawyer may only have
contact with the court (1) in the course of official proceedings in the cause;
(2) in writing, if opposing counsel is promptly delivered a copy of the writ-
ing; or (3) orally, if opposing counsel is given adequate notice.73
Thus, given the trial judge's order, the plaintiff's cause of action is limited
and- restricted because he may not apprise the court of vital information or
effectively support his position. Furthermore, the right to appeal is denied
because plaintiff is unable to file a motion for an appeal.
VII. TEXAS RULE 3.08: LAWYER As WITNESS
Texas Rule 3.08 places various limits on an advocate who is also a witness.
Unlike its predecessor, 74 and unlike many other conflicts rules, 75 this rule
does not impute the disqualification of the lawyer/witness to other lawyers
in the same firm. 76 The primary purpose of this rule is to prevent confusion
of the fact finder, who sees the lawyer acting both as a partisan advocate and
as a supposedly neutral fact witness. It is difficult for the fact finder to dis-
tinguish evidence from argument, particularly if the advocate is put in the
position of arguing her credibility.
In Spears v. The Fourth Court of Appeals,7 7 discussed above, the court
rejected the State's efforts to disqualify attorney Maisel under Rule 3.08, the
lawyer-witness rule, which bars continued representation: (a) "if the lawyer
knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to estab-
lish an essential fact on behalf of the lawyer's client";7 8 or, (b) "the lawyer
believes that the lawyer will be compelled to furnish testimony that will be
substantially adverse to the lawyer's client unless the client consents after
70. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13.
71. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(2)(b).
72. Kahn, 816 S.W.2d at 133.
73. Id. The Code of Judicial Conduct supports this conclusion. It provides: "A judge,
except as authorized by law, shall not directly or indirectly initiate, permit, nor consider ex
parte or other communications concerning the merits of a pending or impending judicial pro-
ceeding .... Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 pt. A (1974).
74. TEX. CODE DR 5-101(B).
75. E.g., TEX. RULES 1.06(0; 1.07(e); 1.09(b)(c).
76. However, the lawyer who is a witness must secure the informed consent of the client if
another lawyer in the firm is acting as an advocate. See TEX. RULE 3.08(c).
77. 797 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. 1990).
78. TEX. RULE 3.08(a).
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full disclosure."'79 The court held that subsection (b) was inapplicable be-
cause neither party alleged that Maisel's testimony would be adverse to her
firm's client.80 In order for subsection (a) to be applicable, the movant must
show actual prejudice as a result of the dual roles of lawyer and witness.81
The IAB only intended to call Maisel as a witness at trial if the Executive
Director of IAB changed his current testimony (which conflicts with no
other testimony) at trial, but there was no reason to expect that. The court
found that the IAB motion had "all the appearances of a tactical weapon"8' 2
because the IAB had failed to prove Maisel was a necessary witness in the
action.
The witness disqualification against attorney Maisel certainly did not ap-
pear to fit within the contours of Texas Rule 3.08. However, a court should
not be reluctant to disqualify an attorney who fits within the Rule's prohibi-
tion. Comment 9 provides that Texas Rule 3.08 is "not well suited to use as
a standard for procedural disqualification"8 3 because the main purpose of
the rule is to protect the client - to insure that the client's case is not com-
promised, and to insure that the client is not burdened by counsel who will
have to offer adverse testimony. That comment is simply not consistent with
comment 4, which provides that "the principal concern" is that the lawyer
who is simultaneously a witness will create "possible confusion" for the fact
finder.84 The need to protect the fact finder is a systemic interest, an interest
in the system of justice, that supports the disqualification of a lawyer who
violates Texas Rule 3.08. That is why the client has no power to waive all
aspects of this rule. The rule does not exist just for the benefit of the client.
Hence, while a lawyer should not "subvert" the true purpose of this rule8 5
- the lawyer, after all, should not "subvert" any rule - courts should be
quite willing to enforce actual violations of this rule during the course of
litigation. Given that the rule does not mandate imputed disqualification,
and the disqualified lawyer (while not able to take an "active role before the
tribunal") is even able to advise and consult with the actual litigator,86 the
client does not suffer any real disadvantages.
Another decision elaborating on the advocate-witness rule is Schwager v.
Texas Commerce Bank.8 7 The issue before the court was whether counsel is
disqualified from serving as appellate counsel when he testified as a witness
at trial. The court found no disqualification.88
During trial the appellate counsel gave testimony as the accountant of the
client. At this time he was an accountant, not an attorney, and had not yet
passed his bar examination. Then he obtained his license and was admitted
79. TEX. RULE 3.08(b).
80. Spears, 797 S.W.2d at 658.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. TEX. RULE 3.08 comment 9.
84. TEX. RULE 3.08 comment 4.
85. TEX. RULE 3.08 comment 10.
86. TEX. RULE 3.08(c).
87. 813 S.W.2d 225, (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist] 1991, no writ).
88. Id. at 227.
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to the Texas State Bar. The court reasoned that at the time of trial appellate
counsel was not an attorney of record, did not act as the client's trial coun-
sel, and was not bound by the State Bar rules because he did not have a
license.8 9 More importantly, barring counsel from representing his client on
appeal in this case would not further the rationale of Texas Rule 3.08, which
is concerned with the possible confusion of the trier of fact, caused when the
lawyer wears two hats - one as an advocate, the other as a witness. Be-
cause an appellate court does not find facts, there is no risk of confusion. 9°
Where no such risk of confusion or actual prejudice exists, the reason to
apply Texas Rule 3.08 does not exist.
VIII. TEXAS RULE 5.04: REFERRAL FEES To DISBARRED LAWYERS
Texas Rule 1.04(o governs referral fees between lawyers in different law
firms. Texas Rule 5.04(a) forbids a lawyer from sharing or promising to
share legal fees with a nonlawyer, subject to various exceptions. Lee v.
Cherry,91 raised an interesting question that involved both of these rules.
The issue was whether, in a referral fee arrangement, the referring attorney
is still entitled to his fee when he has been disbarred or has resigned before
the case is settled or reduced to judgment, or whether such payment would
constitute fee-splitting with a nonlawyer as prohibited by Texas Rule 5.04.
Lee, while a licensed attorney, entered into a one-third fee referral agree-
ment with Cherry after receiving the written consent of his client to this
arrangement. Three years later Lee was suspended from the practice of law
for two years. Five years later Cherry settled the case involving the fee ar-
rangement for 1.6 million dollars. Lee requested his one-third referral fee,
according to the agreement, but Cherry refused, saying that State Bar rules
prohibit the sharing of attorney's fees with a nonlawyer. (Appellee's counsel
was asked by the court during oral argument if, assuming the court ruled in
his favor, would appellee be willing to remit the forfeited referral fee to the
injured client. His response was somewhat ambiguous.)
Cherry at trial argued that Lee had abandoned and waived his claim to
one-third of the fees when he resigned his license to practice law. Lee coun-
tered that long before he resigned, he had performed all legal duties required
of him under the referral agreement. Therefore no waiver or abandonment
had taken place.
The divided court first noted that an attorney who is disbarred or resigns
during a case before he has completed the work he has been engaged to
perform has voluntarily abandoned his client, and therefore abandons any
89. Id. at 226.
90. Id. at 227.
91. 812 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
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right to collect his fee.92 Such were the facts in Royden v. Ardoin,93 where a
client employed an attorney, on a contingent fee arrangement, to recover
funds from the estate of a widow's son. This attorney was later disbarred
and "[p]rior to the execution of this contract" was not able to complete his
services.94 The supreme court held that the disbarred attorney could not
recover either under the contract or under quantum meruit for services ren-
dered.95 However, the court of appeals held that it would not extend this
principle to a lawyer who had performed all that is required of him in the
attorney-client relationship prior to his resignation or disbarment, and that
such a nonlawyer will still be entitled to his fee. The court reasoned that
such an extension would not further the rationale behind Texas Rule 5.04.96
The dissent relied on the broad language of Royden as well as on the court
judgment suspending the appellant and providing that Respondent Lee is
"hereby enjoined from practicing law in Texas,... accepting any fee directly
or indirectly for legal services."197
Subsequently, in State Bar v. Faubion,98 another decision from the Hous-
ton court of appeals, the court concluded that Faubion engaged in illegal fee-
splitting with one of his employees. Faubion compensated his parale-
gal/investigator by paying him "20% to 33 1/3 % of the gross fees, calcu-
lated upon Price's time involvement in a particular case." 99 The court said
that Price's payments were not analogous to an hourly wage, although par-
tially calculated on time spent on a particular case, because they were based
on a percentage of particular legal fees. Therefore Faubion's compensation
arrangement was a violation of DR 3-102, which prohibits the sharing of
legal fees with a nonlawyer except for payments to the estate of a deceased
lawyer or payments to a retirement plan.1°°
IX. TEXAS RULE 7.01: MISLEADING ADVERTISING
State Bar v. Faubion 101 held that Faubion committed professional miscon-
92. Id. at 363. But see Texas Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion 432, 49 TEXAS
B.J. 1013 (1986). In this opinion, attorney # 1 had a contingent fee agreement with attorney
#2. While the case was on appeal, attorney #1 was disbarred. The Opinion concluded that
attorney #2 could not pay attorney # 1 either pursuant to the contract or pursuant to quan-
tum meruit, because attorney #1 had "voluntarily abandoned" the client.
93. 331 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. 1960).
94. 331 S.W.2d at 209.
95. Id.
96. Lee, 812 S.W.2d at 364.
97. Id. (Sears, J., dissenting).
98. State Bar v. Faubion, No. C14-91-00027-CV, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2045 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
99. Id. at "10.
100. The court relied on DR 3-102 of the former Texas Disciplinary Rules. There should
be the same result under TEX. RULE 5.04(a)(3).
Both of these Rules prohibit including non-lawyer employees in a profit sharing plan except
a retirement plan. These rules are different from ABA Model Rule 5.04(a)(3) and DR 3-
101(B)(3), both of which allow a lawyer to include nonlawyers in a "compensation or retire-
ment plan" based in whole or in part on profit sharing.
101. State Bar v. Faubion, No. C14-91-00027-CV, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 2045 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991).
1992] 2049
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
duct when he continued to use a letterhead that held him out to be a certified
civil trial specialist for over a year after his certification had expired for fail-
ure to fulfill continuing legal education requirements. This conduct violated
DR 1-102(A) of the former Rules, now Texas Rule 7.01(1), which prohibits
a lawyer from making any false or misleading communication about the law-
yer or his services. A false or misleading communication is one that "con-
tains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading." 10 2
The court held that the use of the letterhead after his certification had ex-
pired was a material misrepresentation of fact in a communication, and that
the State need not prove detrimental reliance by others before a violation of
DR 2-101(A) can be found. 103 The court also held that this conduct consti-
tuted a violation of DR 1- 102(A)(4), now Texas Rule 8.04(a)(3), because
Faubion misrepresented his professional status. °4 Both DR 1- 102(A)(4)
and Texas Rule 8.04(a)(3) prohibit an attorney from engaging in conduct
involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation."
X. TEXAS RULE 8.04: MISCONDUCT
Texas Rule 8.04(a)(2) provides that a lawyer shall not commit a "serious
crime," which is defined, inter alia, as "any felony involving moral turpi-
tude."105 This definition incorporates the requirements of article X, sections
7(8) and 26 of the State Bar rules.1o6 This rule, like its predecessors, is am-
biguous because not all felonies involve moral turpitude. Texas case law has
concluded that the court must consider the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the felony in order to determine if the felony, and the facts
related to it, amount to "moral turpitude."' 0 7
Hernandez v. State Bar of Texas 0 8 considered the case of an attorney who
had been convicted of indecency with a child by contact. In the criminal
case, the court sentenced the attorney-defendant to a two-year deferred adju-
dication. The State Bar then brought a proceeding to discipline the attorney.
In this later adjudication, the trial court suspended the attorney for three
years. 109
In the disciplinary proceeding the trial court had found, as a matter of
law, that indecency with a child (by contact) fell within the definition of a
felony involving moral turpitude pursuant to section 81.178 of the Texas
102. TEX. RULE 7.01(a)(1).
103. Faubion, at *7.
104. Id.
105. TEX. RULE 8.04(b). The rule goes on to define "serious crime" in a functional sense,
as including any "misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent misappropriation
of money or other property, or any attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of another to commit"
a serious crime.
106. Robert P. Schuwerk & John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct, 27A Hous. L. REV. 1, 473 (1990).
107. Turton v. State Bar, 775 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied).
108. 812 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).




Government Code and article X, section 26 of the State Bar rules.' 10 How-
ever, appellant in Hernandez did not challenge that holding, and did not
argue that the trial court should have considered the circumstances sur-
rounding the crime.
Instead, the disciplined lawyer argued on appeal that the trial court was in
error because it imposed the suspension from the date of the disciplinary
proceeding, not from the date of the criminal conviction. The disciplined
lawyer claimed that he was automatically suspended as of the date of the
criminal conviction. Consequently, the appellant argued to the court that he
was denied due process because the trial court had failed to consider the
proper effective date of his suspension.
Appellant based that argument, in part, on section 81.078 (b) of the Texas
Government Code which provides for compulsory discipline of an attorney's
criminal misconduct."1 The court, however, refused to consider this argu-
ment because appellant failed to raise it in the trial court and did not raise it
in his notice of limitation of appeal. 112
XI. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
Several cases raised various issues of procedure involving imposition of
discipline. These cases do not raise substantive questions of legal ethics, but
they present some interesting procedural questions. In Smith v. O'Neill' 13
the issue was whether the court retains jurisdiction to reinstate probation of
an attorney's suspension once that probation of suspension has been
revoked.
Smith and the State entered into an agreed judgment, which said in part
that Smith had committed several instances of professional misconduct and
that he was suspended from the practice of law for six years for each act of
misconduct and that the suspension was probated on the partial condition
that Smith pay restitution to the victims of his professional conduct.
Smith failed to pay the restitution, and the State Bar obtained an order
revoking probation. Two years later, Smith filed a motion to reinstate pro-
110. Id. at 77.
111. Section 81.078(b) provides:
"On proof of an attorney's conviction of any felony involving moral turpitude
... the district court of the county of the residence of the convicted attorney
shall cnter an order suspending the attorney from the practice of law during the
pendency of any appeals from the conviction. An attorney who has been given
probation after conviction, whether adjudicated or unadjudicated, shall be sus-
pended from the practice of law during the probation."
TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 81.078(b) (Vernon 1988) (emphasis added).
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES, art. X § 26 (located in the Texas Govern-
ment Code in title 2, subtitle G app.) requires counsel to initiate an action seeking compulsory
discipline whenever an attorney is convicted of a serious crime in which the conviction will
serve as conclusive evidence of the guilt of the attorney for the crime. This section, like
§ 81.078 requires that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law during any period of
probation sentenced upon conviction and further provides that the court in a disciplinary ac-
tion has the discretion to impose further sanctions, such as disbarment, if warranted.
112. Hernandez, 812 S.W.2d at 78.
113. 813 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. 1991).
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bation claiming that his prior acts of misconduct were due to a cocaine ad-
diction, that he has been free of all mind changing chemicals for two years,
and that he has had, and continues to receive, treatment for his addiction.
In other words, he argued that becoming drug-free constitutes a change of
circumstances that entitles him to a hearing on his motion to reinstate
probation.
The State Bar objected to such a hearing, alleging that the trial court
lacked jurisdiction because the agreed judgment and order revoking proba-
tions were final. The supreme court disagreed. The order revoking proba-
tion is like a decree of injunction because it enjoins Smith from practicing
law, performing legal services, holding himself out as an attorney, appearing
before tribunals as counsel, and accepting legal fees. Decrees of injunction
may be reviewed, opened, vacated or modified by the trial court upon a
showing of changed conditions.114 As a result, the trial court abused its
discretion in refusing to hear Smith's evidence of changed circumstances.
In State Bar v. Wolfe115 a trial judge privately reprimanded an attorney
for professional misconduct. However, state rules do not provide for a pri-
vate reprimand. The only possible types of sanctions are reprimand, suspen-
sion, or disbarment. The State Bar disciplinary rules provide that the
reprimand "will be publicized." '1 16 Consequently, the trial court had no
power to "probate" the public reprimand in order to convert it to a private
reprimand. 117
XII. JUDICIAL CODE, CANON 2: THE JUDGE AS WITNESS
Canon 2 of the Texas Code of Judicial Conduct,"I8 is derived from the
A.B.A. Model Code of Judicial Conduct. The title to that canon provides
that a "Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities." The issue before the supreme court in Joachim v. Cham-
bers"19 was whether a retired judge who continues to serve as a judicial of-
ficer by assignment may testify as an expert witness. The court concluded
that, in the circumstances of this case, he may not do so.' 2 0
The majority admitted that no clause of the judicial code governed this
114. See City of Tyler v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry., 405 S.W.2d 330, 332 (Tex. 1966).
115. 801 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990 no writ).
116. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES article X, § 8(4) (1986).
117. The appellee argued that the court had the discretion to probate the public reprimand
to a private reprimand by virtue of § 23 (A) of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, which states: "In
all judgments of disbarment, suspension or reprimand, the court may make and enter all such
other and further orders as the protection of the public and the respondent's client may re-
quire, including probation of a suspension or reprimand." However, the appellate court inter-
preted "the plain language" of the statue as evidencing an intent on the part of the legislature
to allow the trial court to enter other orders if necessary for the public's protection. The
statute does not authorize the court to reduce any of the three possible orders listed in § 23(C)
for the benefit of the offending attorney. Therefore, "when read together, §§ 8 and 23 require
that, if a judge determines a reprimand is the appropriate punishment, then that reprimand
must be publicized." 801 S.W.2d at 204.
118. TEX. SUPREME COURT, CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
119. 815 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1991).
120. Id. at 241.
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situation explicitly, and that a judge is competent to testify, except, of
course, at a trial in which he is presiding. However, to the majority the issue
was not competency but propriety. 121
The court first held that Canon 2 applies to former judges who continue to
sit by assignment. Then the court held that expert testimony by a judge
violates Canon 2 of the judicial code of conduct because, although a judge
may be competent to testify as an expert witness, it is improper for him to do
so because it lent the prestige and credibility of the judicial office to the side
who called him as a witness, it undermined judicial integrity by jeopardizing
the image of impartiality a judge is to maintain, and placed opposing counsel
in the awkward position of having to vigorously cross-examine a judge who
may preside over future trials in which opposing counsel must participate. 122
However, the court cautioned that the judicial code does not always pro-
hibit the judge from testifying at trial or during a deposition. 123 It advised
that the principles of the Code of Judicial Conduct should be used to provide
the standards that a court should apply in its determination of the permissi-
ble scope of judicial testimony. For instance, a judge may be permitted to
testify where he has personal knowledge of facts material to the case for
which no other alternative means is reasonably available. 124
121. Id. at 237.
122. Id. at 238.
123. Id. at 239.
124. Joachim, 815 S.W.2d at 239. Justice Gonzalez, in dissent, argued that the Code of
Judicial Conduct simply does not prohibit judges from testifying as experts; the court should
not be overly concerned about the fragile image of the judiciary; and the relators did not
demonstrate the irreparable injury needed for mandamus.
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